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Imagine a contemporary cultural and political European scene beset by dual forms of 
impoverished imagination. By “impoverished” I mean forms of imagination and the 
imaginary that are systematically locked in dead-ends, sabotaged, bereft of the ability 
to function as vital, social and political energies and forces. If this is indeed the case, 
an ancient scepticism towards the vagaries of formless and unpredictable 
imagination, would seem to have proved its point: imagination is perchance an 
incapacitated and debilitating, hence heinous force. One of the peculiar traits of this 
arguable triumph of a certain rationalism, is that one of the key doctrines for the 
political and economical subjects of today, is that we should be constantly 
“innovative”, be it in our private lives, in our careers, or as national citizens locked in 
a perennial, global strife with all other nation-states. I contend, that we are all 
confronted by what I term an imaginary imperative: Imagine, or you’re done for. I 
want to elucidate the paradoxical twists and turns of the concept of imagination via 
the pairing of two exceedingly odd bedfellows, namely Irish Samuel Beckett on the 
one hand, and on the other the various set of so-called “reality-shows”, such as e.g. 
“Big Brother”, “Paradise Hotel”, and so on. The purpose is not merely to modestly 
elucidate an otherwise obscure conundrum (how come the absolute, paralyzing death 
of imagination is ensconced in an ubiquitous “imaginary imperative”?), but as well to 
immodestly suggest possible ways out of an unpleasant paralysis of imagination 
proper.    
 
First, we have to take a detour via a botanizing round-trip in the historically diverse 
philosophies of the imagination, the purpose being to confront two opposed, extreme 
strands in any thinking of that vague concept and phenomenon: either outright 
rejection, or else jubilant celebration. We’ll then move on to an analytical comparison 
and confrontation between reality-TV and Beckett’s short prose text Imagination 
dead imagine. Interestingly, these otherwise diametrically opposed and different 
phenomena (reality-TV, Beckett’s prose) both testify to types and modalities of a 
contemporary, destitute imagination. At the end, possible political and aesthetic 
escape-routes or blind alleys will be dwelled upon.   
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The Split Fate of Imagination 
 
Notoriously – and inveterately – the notion of imagination has had a bad name in the 
far from venerable tradition of philosophy. Although Aristotle was the one, in De 
Anima, who truly could be said to have discovered “imagination” as a distinct 




Bypassing the long, complex history of ideas as concerns the twists and turns of the 
notion of “imagination” as a distinct capability in its own right, I want us to swiftly 
inspect two important, pre-Enlightenment figures, namely Thomas Hobbes (1588-
1679) and Blaise Pascal (1623-1662). Hobbes and Pascal are interesting in this 
context, because they appear before the split between enlightenment rationalism and 
a counter-Enlightenment romanticism (Kant versus Hamann, etc.), and further 
because they are very far apart philosophically, and yet they converge in their 
rejection of the force and status of imagination.   
 
Thomas Hobbes for one did not hesitate, in Leviathan (1651), to define imagination 
as “decayed sense”, meaning a purely derivative and faded imprint of an original and 
sensory impression:  
 
“For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, wee still retain an image 
of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, the Latines 
call Imagination, from the image made in seeing; and apply the same, though 
improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it Fancy; which signifies 
appearance, and is as proper to one sense, as to another. Imagination therefore is 
nothing but decaying sense; and is found in men, and many other living creatures, 




And Pascal, in Pensées (posthumously published 1669), although he did 
symmetrically reverse Hobbes’ verdict by calling imagination “cette superbe 
puissance”, immediately hammered stigmata in the body of that insidious entity by 
adding, “ennemie de la raison, qui se plait à la contrôler et à la dominer”
4
. So Pascal 
accorded imagination an immense power, only to quickly castrate it as being 
inherently damaging and futile, posing a serious threat to the allegedly unimaginative, 
drab, but far more reliable rule of reason.  
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Schematically put, and bypassing many intrinsically interesting chapters in the long, 
arduous history of the notion of “imagination”
5
, various philosophers have tended to 
veer between denigrating imagination as a mere dull imprint of an originary 
sensualism, what Cornelius Castoriadis has peremptorily called the “conventional 
doctrine of the imagination”. Or else, in the wake of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason 
(1781), describing it as a passive, yet somehow mediating force between the pure 
sensuous manifold of intuition and the cognitive synthetic activity of Understanding
6
. 
According to Kant, imagination plays a crucial, ordering role in-between the 
receptive influx of sensory data, and the organizing spontaneity of pure cognition. 
 
However, as is well known the question of schematism and the transcendental power 
of imagination was never properly resolved by Kant, and ever since Heidegger’s 
epochal Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929), the notion of “imagination” 
have enjoyed a virtually full-fledged rehabilitation, bordering on a renaissance, in the 
realm of philosophy in the twentieth century. We have – scattered across as diverse 
currents as neo-kantianism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, psychoanalysis, ordinary 
language philosophy, and what have you – exemplary and important contributions in 
the form of Hans Vaihinger’s als-ob, Wittgenstein’s “seeing-as”, Cassirer’s symbolic 
forms, Bachelard’s material imaginary, Sartre’s imaginary, Merleau-Ponty’s 
chiasmus, Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutic imagination, Castoriadis’ radical social 





 It would seem that the initial and ancient scepticism towards the imaginary 
and imagination have been replaced – at least within the confines of continental 
philosophy - by an enthusiastic embrace of its liberating potential. Imagination 
dabbles in possibilities, potentialities, poiesis, virtualities – much rather than 
necessity, actuality, concretion, mimesis. 
  
If in the words of Kant, we distinguish between the passive “exhibitio derivativa”, 
and the inherently productive force of “intuitus originarius”
9
, the majority of modern 
philosophers and cultural theorists seem to have opted for the latter notion, although 
of course in any number of different versions and visions thereof.     
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Still, part of the problem seems to be that imagination is unavoidable and necessary – 
we can’t do without it. And yet at the same time it is inherently slippery and vague, in 
the terms of Castoriadis: imagination is impossible to fixate and to place in its proper 
location. Apparently, it is simultaneously ubiquitous and unlocatable. 
 
Bachelard and Castoriadis: Matter and sociality?   
 
Now, if we cast a brief glance at Gaston Bachelard and Castoriadis themselves, they 
have both heroically tried to wrest imagination from its late-romantic prison-house of 
subjectivity and fancy. Bachelard is relevant, because he comes up with an extreme, 
quasi-phenomenological, totalizing celebration of the imagination, and Castoriadis 
because he insists on the inherently social and political nature of the exercise of 
imagination. Between them, they constitute two of the extreme and not entirely 
unproblematic ends on the scale of positive positions within the present-day 
predilection for imagination.  
 
Gaston Bachelard, by arguing that we can ascribe matter itself a measure of 
imaginary traits, so that nature is in a sense imbued with its own limitless imaginary 
capacity, supplementing our own, dreamlike engagement in and with the world. I 
quote from Bachelard’s The Poetics of Space (1958): “Imagination has the integrating 
powers of the three. It is root and branch. It lives between earth and sky. Imagination 
lives in the earth and in the wind. The imaginative tree is imperceptibly the 
cosmological tree, the tree which summarizes a universe, which makes a universe”
10
. 
For Bachelard, imagination bespeaks ontological plenitude, it betokens the ability of 
the monadic subject to fracture and recreate itself in a fecund encounter with the 
world in being.  
 
Bachelard’s pupil, Mikel Dufrenne, stressed that: “It is the image that arouses 
imagination, because perception is not equal to the task, and because 
conceptualization is useless whenever the meaning is so deeply embedded within the 
object that it would be lost if abstracted”. What happens, according to the likes of 
Bachelard and Dufrenne, is that strictly speaking we do not make use of imagination, 
rather we ourselves are used by it when touching the world: “affectivity and 
imagination work in close proximity. Affectivity opens a world that imagination can 
inhabit, and imagination, in its turn, excites feeling (…) through the affective quality 
we are literally touched”
11
. The central argument is, that anterior to the reflectively 
mediated split between subject and object, we are ensconced in a situation in which 
the unfinished and emergent vibration of both sides gently touch, as was beautifully 
phrased by Merleau-Ponty: “There is no break at all in this circuit: it is impossible to 
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say that nature ends here and man or expression starts here. It is, therefore, mute 




As we will have occasion to realize a little later, the optimism and exuberance of this 
phenomenology of the imagination is thoroughly negated in the work of Samuel 
Beckett, as well as in the popular forms of Reality-TV.  
 
But Bachelard & co. weren’t the only ones to attempt to leave behind the intra-
subjective or egological vicissitudes of Kantian and post-kantian theories of the 
imagination. Cornelius Castoriadis tried to do so by pinpointing what he termed the 
“radical, social imaginary”, meaning by that an irreducible instance of socially 
mediated invention embedded as a pre-rational genetic element in the creation of 
human institutions and symbolic structures.  
 
In both cases, imagination is moved outside the perimeter of closed, monadic, 
subjective consciousness, either by way of Bachelard’s projective naturalization of 
imagination, or else Castoriadis’ socialization of it.  
In so doing, they may have rescued imagination from its batch of heinous 
connotations to do with the Janus-face of the visual, the image, and the fictional. This 
may, however, constitute nothing but a displacement and perhaps even a 
disfigurement of the intractable complexities haunting the very notion of 
“imagination”.  
 
For, even if we grant Bachelard’s flippant, phenomenological naturalization, or 
Castoriadis’ neo-aristotelian proto-socialization, we still find ourselves in the midst of 
a cultural setting that endlessly seem to cultivate and capitalize on the virtues of 
imagination, albeit in the shallow shape of so-called “creativity” and “innovation”.  
 
In that overall, socio-historical sense, Bachelard’s phenomenological naturalization 
and Castoriadis’ post-marxist socialization, seems to have been supplanted and 
superseded by a general, quantifiable commodification of imagination. What is of the 
essence, today, is the ability to capitalize on being imaginative. Or rather, what is 
mortifying is being bereft of imagination; what we’re encumbered by today, is a 
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C: Negative Imagination 
 
Slavoj Zizek, in The Ticklish Subject (1999), swerve past positions such as 
Bachelard’s and Castoriadis’, but indirectly highlight the conundrums of this 
troublesome scenario.  
 
Via a daring reading of early Hegel and Lacan, Zizek not only accepts Heidegger’s 
radical re-reading of the place and force of transcendental imagination in the work of 
Kant, but tries to go at least one step further.  
Zizek’s project consist in portraying the immanent force of imagination itself as split 
between a potentially benign and productive side; the one cherished by Bachelard, 
Ricoeur & co; and a rather gruesome, negative and ominous side, to do with violence, 
lack of form and unity, dissolution, dismemberment.  
 
Zizek quotes Hegel: “The human being is this night, this empty nothing, that contains 
everything in its simplicity – an unending wealth of many representations, images, of 
which none belongs to him – or which are not present. This night, the interior of 
nature, that exists here – pure self – in phantasmagorical representations, is night all 
around it, in which here shoots a bloody head – there another white ghastly 
apparition, suddenly here before it, and just so disappears. One catches sight of this 
night when one looks human beings in the eye – into a night that becomes awful”
13
     
 
Now, this somewhat opaque, nightmarish and enigmatic passage from Hegel’s early 
Jenaer Realphilosophie is used by Zizek to argue, that Kant and even Heidegger 
overlooked or thrust aside the frightful, negative, nocturnal aspect of imagination.  
According to Zizek, Hegel’s dark intuition bespeaks imagination’s ability to tear 
reality into dislocated membra disjecta, a pre-synthetic and pre-ontological moment 
that would constitute the abyss of imagination. Zizek reads this à la Lacan, that is to 
say as a universal, repressed but immanent feature of all and every encounter with the 
impossible Real.  
 
I would like to slightly vulgarize and gloss over Zizek’s claim, by suggesting that this 
entire, gloomy aspect of imagination, its negative work, is one possible way of 
comprehending what we come across when watching reality-TV and reading Beckett.   
 
My point is, that although this brief, selective stroll through the history of philosophy 
provide us with a setting for triumphantly re-instating imagination as a trans-
subjective stratum in its own right, this very triumph manifests itself as a conspicuous 
repetition of the initial condemnation of imagination. From its earliest appearance in 
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Plato, on to today’s rampant, mindless and incessant demand to be “innovative” and 
“creative”, things have gone from bad to worse.  
So, in essence Pascal was absolutely right, when he intuited that imagination was the 
ardent enemy of reason, although a formidable enemy to the extent that the 
phantasmatic and imaginary is solidly located in the midst of pre-transcendental 
schematism.    
 
These days, the belligerent aspect of imagination occurs in two symmetric, but 
perhaps indistinct registers. One concerns the attempt to achieve an absolute 
proximity to what is termed “reality”, in effect erasing the distinction between 
imaginary and real being. The other, a fearful distancing from the self-same world of 
“reality”. The “real” is heralded and summoned and even severely abused in both the 
case of reality-TV and Beckett. And in both instances I suggest that we are up against 
(ironically) opposed forms of posthumous imagination. Zizek’s negative imagination 
is embodied in the contemporary imaginary imperative: The relentless and unending 
demand to make use of imagination testifies to an almost sadistic impoverishment of 
the phantasmatic realm.     
 
 
From Temptation Island to Beckett 
 
My simple suggestion is, that the epitome and symptom of the present 
impoverishment of our collective notion of imagination, socio-empirically shows 
itself in the epidemic popularity of so-called “reality-TV”. I do realize, that at this 
point there is a risk of sounding like a grumpy, sour misanthrope bemoaning the 
reifying decay of late capitalism, the rampant society of the spectacle, and the 
hegemony of the culture industry; but that’s certainly not my intention nor my point – 
what I’m driving at, or moving towards, is the possibility of sketching and opposing 
two distinct forms of imaginative impoverishment. 
 
One is embodied in the contemporary wallowing in reality-TV, computer-games, 
courses and companies cultivating so-called innovation and creativity; a vast and 
heterogeneous field of social and discursive phenomena.  
In this context I wish to focus on a few examples of reality-TV that will serve as a 
contrastive spring-board to my other, main example, namely Samuel Beckett’s short 




In Beckett’s brief text, an anonymous third-person voice call forth two sets of 
images; one of a tropical paradise of sorts: “Islands, waters, azure, verdure, one 
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glimpse and vanished, endlessly, omit”
15
; and another of a small, white rotunda made 
of a bone-like material, and containing two naked immobile bodies, “Go back out, a 
plain rotunda, all white in the whiteness, go back in, rap, solid throughout, a ring as in 




So in Beckett we have two distinct imaginary settings: one of tropical idyll and 
another of closed containment. In both instances, the inspection and examination of 
those alleged figments embodying signs of life are premised on a paradoxical use of 
what we might term posthumous imagination, encapsulated in the pithy initial words: 
“No trace anywhere of life, you say, pah, no difficulty there, imagination not dead 
yet, yes, dead, good, imagination dead imagine.”
17
 We are called upon to attempt to 
imagine the modality of an essentially and unavoidably posthumous imagination.  
 
 
What I want to do is to single out and compare in passing these two defunct 
imaginary settings with two opposed favourite haunts of contemporary reality-TV, 
namely the isolated tropical island temporarily inhabited by a small number of 
contestants, as well as the closed house occupied by a modest herd of hopeful 
participants.  
 
What strikes me, is the number of obvious similarities and differences embedded in 
these two parallel but vastly different, culturally mediated registers of imaginary 
topography – that of reality-TV and Beckett. My suggestion is, that the central 
similarity consists in their dual negotiations of the impoverishment of the 
imagination. They both tend to implicitly negate the exuberant optimism of 
Bachelard, as well as the robust post-marxism of Castoriadis; and they both of them 
obey, in ironically differing ways, the painful imaginary imperative, the order and 
command to imagine although imagination is dead.  
 
Beckett, by carrying out the obscure and inexplicable demand to make use of an 
extinct imaginative capability; reality-TV by visually and affectively exploring a 
cultural terrain devoid of any truly productive and fertile imagination – what we meet 
at the isolated island and in the closed-off house (and often in Beckett as well!) is 
first of all boredom, inactivity, monotony, inane competition, puerile plots. In brief: 
The conspicuous lack of any truly imaginative activity whatsoever. The very 
commercial concept itself is idiotic and insipid, sold off and circulating in any 
number of countries – and yet it generates vast amounts of economic value and 
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distributes as well as shapes intense currents of psycho-socially mediated desire and 
energy.  
 
But let me be clear: What we have here is not a lack of imagination, far from it. It’s 
something infinitely worse, namely the tiresome stupidity of a posthumous 
imagination that is never going to stop. TV-producers come up with an endless 
number of exceedingly silly and obscene concepts for new reality-shows, viewers and 
participants incessantly invent new modes of becoming semi-known for a little while, 
or are merely killing time in the service of negative imagination. And it’s all taking 
place squarely in the midst of a terrain of imagination. For are we not we dealing with 
an opening up of new, possible worlds for a majority of individuals? The literal 
poiesis of plastic surgery in “extreme makeover”, the chance to meet the one and only 
rich bachelor, for the girl next door; the opportunity to become famous and popular 
for the lazy and mediocre everyman? 
 
Poverty, Beckett  
 
In an exceedingly odd way, this general, cultural demise is played out in the work of 
Samuel Beckett.  
 
At this point I would like quote a little from Beckett’s first, unpublished novel, 
Dream of Fair to Middling Women (1932). The quotes are meant to demonstrate the 
way in which Beckett’s early aesthetic pre-ontology chimes in with Zizek’s 
description of tarrying with the negative.  
 
But first: To Beckettians it is hardly surprising to mention that his poetics deals with 
dispossession, poverty, obstacles and failure. Indeed, one of the most cited passages 
in Beckett says as much: “to be an artist is to fail, as no other dare fail, that failure is 
his world and the shrink from it desertion, art and craft, good housekeeping, living”
18
  
The artist is first and foremost lacking in resources, he has: “nothing to express, 
nothing with which to express, nothing from which to express, no desire to express, 
together with the obligation to express”
19
. This latter turn, which is typical Beckett, 
points to his dilemma in terms of imagination: even if there is nothing to be done, the 
artist is duty bound to exert and strain his miserable imagination. The problem is, that 
the world in which the Beckettian artist is placed is not dissimilar to that turbulent 
and ghastly night, Hegel wrote of. In Dream, Beckett’s narrator put it this way:  
 
“I have discerned a disfaction, a désuni, an Ungebund, a flottement, a 
tremblement, a tremor, a tremolo, a disaggregating, a disintegrating, an efflorescence, 
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a breaking down and multiplication of tissue, the corrosive ground-swell of Art (…) 
the coherence gone to pieces, the continuity bitched to hell because the units of 
continuity have abdicated their unity, they have gone multiple, they fall apart, the 
notes fly about, a blizzard of electrons”
20
   
 
On a prim, philological note, we know for a fact that Beckett read and commented on 
Kant’s first Critique
21
, and that in his essay on Proust Beckett severely dismantled 
the niceties of Kantian schematism, but that is not the essential point here. The point 
is, that early Beckett’s acosmism predisposed his work for an opening unto the 
ravaging, negative work of imagination; and what I’m suggesting here, is that late 
Beckett plunged all his texts into the corrosive void envisaged by the juvenile 
Belacqua in Dream.  
 
In so doing, late Beckett perform one possible version of the impoverishment of 
imagination; a version that crack down hard on Bachelard’s benign phenomenology 
of materiality, as well as Castoriadis’ social imaginary. In lieu, we get something that 
quite lives up to the scathing attacks of Pascal and Hobbes, imaginary scenarios that 
stage decayed, posthumous forms of imagination that are indeed enemies of reason.  
 
 
Imagination dead imagine 
 
Now let’s cast another brief glance at IDI. My central hypothesis is, that in IDI 
Beckett simultaneously stages and undermines an empiricist notion of imagination; 
the effect of this dual manoeuvre, is to exhibit the range and modality of an 
impoverished imagination. Basically, the narrative voice taunts an absent second-
person instance, apparently for having suggested that there is no trace of life 
anywhere. The narrative voice then outline for fun a ludicrous tropical paradise, 
quickly omits this mirage and instead focuses on a small, white, bone-like cylinder 
floating in empty space and containing two naked, human bodies, one of each gender, 
lying crouched on the ground, “On their right sides therefore both and back to back 
head to arse”, as the nameless narrator puts it
22
, and back to back. Several things 
strike the uninitiated reader. According to the voice, there is no entrance and yet the 
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The two bodies are neither dead nor alive. They seem to breathe, but at the same time 
their eyes are sometimes open long beyond what is humanly possible
24
. Inside the 
cylinder weather-conditions are unstable, but the voice at one point state that: “world 
still proof against enduring tumult”
25
, and yet afterwards we hear of fierce storms 
raging within. The anonymous voice combines tactile, visual, analytical and narrative 
skills in coming up with this thoroughly paradoxical description of traces of life, and 
yet everything fizzles out in a stage of unknowing, a “blizzard of electrons” to borrow 
Beckett’s own, happy phraseology: “No, life ends and no, there is nothing elsewhere, 
and no question now of ever finding again that white speck lost in whiteness, to see if 
they still lie still in the stress of that storm, or of a worse storm, or in the black dark 




Everything is premised on the workings of the posthumous imagination: “imagination 
not dead yet, yes, dead, good, imagination dead imagine”
27
. And all within is 
measured according to solidly empirical criteria; the diameter of the container, the 
use of a mirror to ascertain whether or not the bodies are alive, the use of the 
biologically oriented term “life”. And yet, the entire scenario is shrouded in a 
distinctive form of mystery. At the end of the tale, we have no idea what the 
container was all about, and even the narrative profess not to know anything about 
the state and whereabouts of the cylinder and its two silent bodies. 
 
And as with the two bodies, we can’t be sure whether or not imagination is properly 
dead. On the one hand it’s still riveted to empirical criteria and standards; on the 
other, it easily ignores empirical obstacles, e.g. in case of the smooth, unobstructed 
entrance and the inexplicably long interval of opened, unblinking eyes. 
 
To my mind, this bespeaks a double register in terms of so-called reality and 
imagination. An infinite distancing from reality, lost in all that whiteness, and 
floundering in the mad night of softly negative imagination. And yet an almost 
nostalgic proximity to reality, and an unwillingness to let go of what is obviously 




Likewise, if we turn for a short while to the glistening world of reality-TV.  
 
As I pointed out, there’s a perhaps interesting similarity between Beckett’s use of the 
tropical island and the closed container on the one hand; and the dramaturgic use of 
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the island and the closed-off house in some of the early and best-known reality-shows 
(Temptation Island, Big Brother).  
 
My contention is, that the peculiar, pointed use of the term “reality” in this specific 
context (“reality-TV”) reveals the queer status of imagination and fantasy in these 
TV-shows. Allegedly, they are based on an isolation of a crucial, but partly hidden 
structure in so-called Real Life, that is, the workings of a reductionist and vulgar neo-
darwinism in the arena of love and career-making.  
 
On the face of it, we claim to believe in true, romantic love and in the fair workings 
of meritocracy. But in reality, the reality that these shows purport to simultaneously 
uncover and stage, things are much more brutal and simple. Therefore, the official 
versions of love and merit are denounced as fragile illusions, in a sense brushed aside 
as imaginary and silly delusions. So although the shows of reality-TV are strictly 
regulated by any number of rules and conventions, this is all done in order to clarify 
and foreground the real, essential nature of life itself. 
 
And yet they of course represent an extreme form of naïve reductionism, an almost 
childish form of cynicism that adds up to a staging of cantankerous fantasy, a puerile 
version of extinct imagination with a view to profit-maximizing. Hobbes’ phrase, 
“decayed sense” suddenly seems to fit in quite well with the description of these 
shows, including their blunt and extreme form of empiricism. Reality becomes 
irrealized in a hazy performance and blurry competition, a spectral hunting and 
haunting of real reality.      
 
In Beckett’s text, temptation island was immediately omitted and erased, so that we at 
least got the spare enigma of the white cylinder; in which, as well, the agile eye of 
Big Brother eventually withdrew. But both Beckett’s text and these shows testify to a 
cultural stage, in which the potentially vigorous and devastating force of imagination 
– positive as well as negative - have become stunted and nullified
28
. They represent 
opposed, yet strangely similar strategies of impoverishment, an almost obsessive 
insistence on the death of imagination in the midst of a haunting, pervasive and 
posthumous imaginary imperative: Imagine, or you’re done for.  
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Thus we have come full circle. Hobbes’ reductive notion of imagination as decayed 
sense, and Pascal’s verdict on the enemy of reason, Kant’s sly evasion, Castoriadis’ 
and Bachelard’s heroic attempts to retrieve and invigorate a sane imagination. They 
have all come to a dead imagination, an odd collapse between the subtle and beautiful 
nightmare of Beckett, and the horrendously stupid, but unending repetitions of 
reality-shows like Big Brother and Temptation Island. The end of it is, that the judges 
were right all along, and that the perhaps slightly too naïve and blue-eyed 
phenomenologists lost out. But does this mean, that there is no way out, no exit? No 
exit from the crossroads of blunted imagination, and no exit from the sadistic and 
impossible demands of an imaginary imperative? Is it at all possible to imagine either 
a resuscitated imagination (Adorno’s and Bloch’s utopian longing for something 
otherwise, a re-stratification of the social imaginary), or else an unexplored escape-
route of sorts firmly embedded within the vagaries of cantankerous fantasies? The 
one would be an alternative proper, the other perhaps an odd default-alternative 
(along the lines of Agamben’s passive, but always immanent withdrawal)?  
 
Large-scale utopian alternatives seem “unrealistic”, as the saying goes, so perhaps we 
need to exercise the right to our free use of imagination in quite other ways, I mean 
ways other than the liberal, but inane distribution of grand utopias (e.g. the abolition 
of capitalist economy). Popper advocated the rather unimaginative, but non-violent 
strategy of “piecemeal engineering”
29
. The only problem with the sympathetic advice 
of Popper is, that it is entirely inconsequential: if adhered to, nothing whatever will 
change. And although Popper (a member of the Mont Pélerin Society!) did 
importantly gauge the totalitarian abyss of revolutionary utopias in the preceding 
century, I’m not sure he foresaw the ever more destructive crises of a rampant, global 
capitalism dead intent on a spiral of endless consumption. It would seem we are 
situated in an impasse. The utopian-revolutionary byway is closed, due to its inherent 
plethora of totalitarian and violent risks as termini ab quo. The reformist-pragmatic 
highway is barred, due to the ever more apparent, internally conflicting crises it gives 
rise to, financial crises, problems to do with inequality and injustice, and so forth. 
Imagination dead, imagine.  
 
So what to do? Yes, we obviously need to make use of our imagination; but how, 
exactly, and to what purpose? One might argue, that these questions are simply badly 
put, i.e. far too general and unspecific. And it’s true that between the field of 
philosophy and that of the social sciences, or political science in particular, the 
relations are far from clear and transparent; in addition, the dirty, intransigent and 
complex web of concrete, contextually bounded circumstances of the political and 
                                                 
29
 Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, London, Routledge 19xx, p. At this point we need to bring in Simon 
Critchley’s deeply interesting, most recent work, The Faith of the Faithless. Experiments in Political Theology, London, 
Verso 2012.  
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socio-cultural settings of diverse European countries further complicate the question 
of how to make use of imagination per se. Nonetheless, I think that the partly 
obscure, but as well partly revealing and enlightening aspects of the unlikely coupling 
of Beckett and reality-TV, sufficiently invite us to at least begin to take seriously the 




Any questions, queries, comments or suggestions are more than welcome. Please feel 
free to mail me at: Zangenberg@sdu.dk or mikkel.bruun.zangenberg@pol.dk.  
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